



Chemical
Safety Levels:
A tool whose
time has come?

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Laboratory Risk Assessment - or - Who Needs a Hood?

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The Laboratory Safety Challenge



- Ever-evolving chemical selection and process
- Lab walls are getting thinner, both figuratively and literally
- Turnover – 20% per year in academia
- The educational culture currently doesn't include risk assessment: but it can

Stakeholders in Laboratory Risk Assessment



- **Laboratory workers** (personal safety and efficient work)
- **Laboratory upper management** (financial and carbon issues)
- **Laboratory designers** (design choices)
- **Laboratory building operators** (personal safety and operations costs)
- **Emergency responders** (emergency planning and response)

Emerging Issues in Lab Risks



- **Ventilation design and energy costs**
 - Optimum ACH
 - Hood design goals
- **Building operation**
 - Protection of maintenance staff
 - Building operations costs
 - Education of lab staff about their buildings
 - Re- and retro- commissioning
- **Emergency planning and response**
 - Pre-plans
 - Scene assessment
 - Response rate: 1 emergency response/250 lab-years
- **Do these challenges point the way from risk assessment to control banding?**
 - Addressing these issues requires development of broader understanding and language for lab chemical risks

Lab Planning and Design: Moving beyond Tradition



- The traditional engineering approach uses a lot of energy without much thought
- Control Banding:
Define Chemical Safety Levels from 1 to 4
- For many purposes, the control band deals with a collection of chemicals rather than a specific biological agent
- The result is a general guideline to appropriate protections (which is likely to need modification, e.g. CSL 2+)

Chemical Risk Assessment



- **Flammability**
 - Concentrations of concern tend to be a few percent by volume
- **Corrosivity**
 - Particles with kinetic energy are much harder to control than vapors
- **Reactivity**
 - Requires chemical and process specific literature review
- **Toxicity**
 - Concentrations of concern range from 1000 ppm to 0.5 ppm to ALARA
- **GHS will help this process**

Chemical Protection Strategies



- **Change the chemical** – limited opportunities in the research setting
- **Engineering controls**
 - General Ventilation
 - Flammable cabinets
 - Local Ventilation
 - Chemical Hoods
- **Administrative Controls and Oversight**
 - 20% turnover/year in academic labs
- **Personal Protective Equipment**
- Traditionally, in chemistry laboratories, fume hood + PPE = “as safe as can be”

Factors to Consider in Selecting a CSL:



- **Flammability** (via MSDS):
 - check flashpoint (is it below ambient temperature?)
 - If yes, are expected airborne concentrations above LEL?
- **Corrosivity** (via pH of solutions):
 - pHs < 2 or > 10.5 require special handling
 - Consider also spattering and off-gassing from reactions
- **Reactivity** (via MSDS and literature review)
 - Check potential interactions and contamination concerns
- **Toxicity** (via MSDS and other sources)
 - Review PELs, TLVs, IDLHs and assess against anticipated concentrations
 - Consider potential interactions
 - ALARA for irreversible hazards (cancer, birth defects, sensitization)

Conceptual Chemical Safety Levels



- **CSL-1:** no ventilation
(e.g. cold rooms and warm rooms)
 - Chemical uses similar to residential settings (kitchens and cleaning products)
- **CSL-2:** general ventilation
(X air changes/hour)
 - Chemical uses similar to cars (gallons of flammables and assorted other chemicals)
- **CSL-3:** local ventilation (i.e. hoods)
 - Chemicals similar to hardware stores – emergency concerns is unexpected reactions
- **CSL-4:** high hazard storage or processes that require specialized procedures

Determining the CSL



Hazard	Fire	Corrosivity	Reactivity	Toxicity
CSL 1	Flashpoint below ambient	$2 < \text{pH} < 10.5$	No chemical changes expected in the process	All chemicals have known toxicities and TLV's > 500 ppm
CSL 2	Flashpoint near ambient, expected concentration < 10% LEL	$\text{pH} < 2$ or $\text{pH} > 10.5$	No known incompatibilities between chemicals being used	All chemicals have known toxicities and $10 \text{ ppm} < \text{TLV's} < 500 \text{ ppm}$
CSL 3	Expected concentration > 10% LEL	Use of heated corrosives	Chemicals with known reactions or contamination hazards present	Unknown toxicities or OEL < 10 ppm
CSL 4			High hazard reactions in use	Irreversible toxicities require use of designated areas

But don't forget the other pieces of the control puzzle



	Facility	Personal Protective Equipment	Oversight	Emergency Response
CSL 1	Any room, no ventilation	None	Generic self inspection guidelines	Standard response
CSL 2	Ventilated lab room (X ACH)	Nitrile gloves, eye protection	General training and oversight	Fire response
CSL 3	Lab room with local ventilation (fume hood)	Appropriate gloves, eye protection, lab coats	Process specific training and protocols	Hazmat defensive response -> commercial clean-up
CSL 4	Specifically designed lab	Process specific PPE	Written SOPs and specific oversight practices	Specialized hazmat response

Implementation at the lab level: A Risk Assessment Spreadsheet



Laboratory Chemical Risk Assessment Form									
<i>complete italicized blocks</i>									
Step 1: Procedure Information									
Title and Duration of Procedure:		<i>name and time frame</i>			Lab Book Reference:		<i>title and page</i>		
Date of Assessment:		Date of Review:		Date of next review:					
<i>date</i>		<i>date</i>		<i>date</i>					
Risk Assessor:		Assessment Reviewer:		People Potentially Affected:					
<i>name</i>		<i>name</i>		<i>groups of people</i>					
Step 2: Risks Identification									
Substances (used or produced) and Concentration (assumed 100% unless otherwise indicated)					1. Physical Hazards				
Chemical name	Maximum Quantity (ml or grams)	Risk Statements	Alternative chemicals considered	Sources of Chemical Specific Information	Flammability Risk Rating	Reactivity Statements and/or pH	Reactivity Risk Rating		
2-methyl-2-butanol	9	JT Baker: 2-4-2-2	List potential alternatives or "Not Possible"	http://www.jtbaker.com/msds/englishhtml/a6408.htm	Flash point: 19C (66F)				
2-methyl-2-butene	10	R10		http://msds.chem.ox.ac.uk/ME/2-methyl-2-butene.html	Flash point: -45 C				
2-methyl-1-butene	10	R12 R22 R65		http://msds.chem.ox.ac.uk/ME/2-methyl-1-butene.html	Flash point: -48 C				
sulfuric acid, 6 M	6	R23 R24 R25 R35 R36 R37 R38 R49		http://msds.chem.ox.ac.uk/SU/sulfuric_acid_concentrated.html	None	Corrosive	3		
	5								
	6								
	7								
	8								
Substances (used or produced) and Concentration (assumed 100% unless otherwise indicated)					2. Health Hazards				
Chemical name	Maximum Quantity (ml or grams)	Risk Statements	Quantity ranking (looked up from exposure potential table)	Physical Form ranking (enter value from exposure potential table)	Operation ranking (enter value from exposure potential table)	Exposure Potential (sum of rankings)	Toxicity Hazard (V,H,M,L from Risk Statements table or other information)	Toxicity Risk Rating (from table)	
2-methyl-2-butanol	9	JT Baker: 2-4-2-2	1	1	2	4	L	1	
2-methyl-2-butene	10	R10	1	1	2	4	L	1	
2-methyl-1-butene	10	R12 R22 R65	1	1	2	4	L	1	
sulfuric acid, 6 M	6	R23 R24 R25 R35 R36 R37 R38 R49	1	1	2	4	V	3	
	5								
	6								
	7								
	8								
Other risk factors: <i>(e.g. use of pressurized equipment, high voltage, lasers, nano particles, etc. that may affect control strategies)</i>									

At the Campus Level, CSL's can be used to:



- Establish an inventory of laboratory rooms in place
 - Preliminary estimate for non-chemistry buildings, 75% CSL 2 labs
- Support design standards for new and renovated lab settings.
- Improve training and emergency planning.
- Support communication between lab workers and facility and emergency support services.
- Plan for climate actions appropriate to the campus.

Next Steps



- Complete a risk assessment tool that addresses the questions of various stakeholders
- Define the boundaries between the various CSL's and where those boundaries blur
- Develop guidance documents for use of CSL's